Political culture theory sees political instability and regime change as the result of incongruities between mass attitudes and values on one hand, and political institutions on the other (Almond and Verba 1963) . Thus, the 'third wave of democracy' that swept the globe from 1975 to 2005 is explained, variously, as a result of the failure of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to supply sufficient economic and political goods to satisfy their citizens, or more broadly, the mismatch between the operating norms of the regime and its constituent institutions and those of the mass public. The key question that occupies public opinion researchers working in new democracies, however, is whether the value structures that questioned and de-legitimated the former authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are sufficient to legitimate and consolidate new democracies.
Perhaps nowhere is this issue better illustrated than in southern Africa where the presence of colonial and settler regimes well into the latter half of the 20th century diverged sharply with even the most minimal human aspirations for dignity, freedom and self-determination. The most extreme manifestation of this was, of course, apartheid South Africa. Whereas most repressive regimes claimed that they were delivering at least some goods valued by their populations (rightist regimes claimed to deliver national self-determination, order, economic growth and infrastructural development; leftist regimes claimed to deliver equality and a form of democracy that was more advanced than its liberal bourgeois competitor), South Africa's ruling National Party could claim, at best, that apartheid protected traditional indigenous cultures from the polluting impact of modernity and prepared Africans for selfgovernment in their own countries. Verwoerdian appeals to cultural relativism and paternalist tutelage, however, were constantly exposed by the harshness of everyday life, whether in the urban townships, the farms of 'white' South Africa, or in the Bantustan homelands, and by the near-totalitarian reach of the apartheid regime and its intrusion into the most intimate aspects of the lives of coloured, Indian and black South Africans.
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Apartheid lasted for 46 years (1948 to 1994) , and probably could have survived at least another ten years if not for the decisive reforms of F.W. de Klerk. While we have little scientific evidence about the state of public attitudes amongst black South Africans under apartheid (for a summary, see De Kock 1995) , few would suggest that it endured this long because black South Africans saw the regime as legitimate, or even remotely agreed with its basic norms and principles. Thus, in the language of political culture theory, apartheid ultimately fell because the norms of racial separation, racial hierarchy and white superiority were rejected by the vast majority of the South African populace.
Yet while popular rejection of its key norms may have led to the demise of apartheid, it is by no means certain that South Africans sufficiently endorse the norms supportive of a liberal democracy. On this issue, we do have extensive social scientific evidence, and virtually all of it agrees that South Africans -of all races -pay minimal lip service to the idea of democracy, and that significant minorities would be willing to countenance one-party rule or strong man dictatorship especially if these regimes promised economic development (or may simply believe erringly that those regimes are consistent with democracy) (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes 2001; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mattes and Thiel 1998) . South Africans also display high levels of intolerance of political difference (Gibson and Gouws 2003) and have the highest levels of xenophobia measured anywhere in the world (Mattes et al. 2000) . 1 These terms refer to the four official population groups created by the National Party government in the late 1940s, and served as the basis for all apartheid policy for the next five decades. They are still widely used today in popular discourse and are also codified in employment equity legislation in the post-apartheid era. 'Black' (alternatively labelled 'Africans') refers to people who speak one of the seven main Bantu language groups. 'White' refers to descendants of Dutch, English, German and Portuguese speaking settlers. 'Coloured' refers largely to descendants of Khoi and San language speakers, or of Malaysians, Indonesians and Chinese people imported by the Dutch as slaves, but also to people who are the descendants of 'mixed' African and European parentage. 'Indian' refers to descendants of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent who came to South Africa largely as indentured workers.
But is there any evidence that democratic values are increasing? South Africa's 1996 Constitution marked a decisive end to two decades of civil conflict and ushered in a democratic regime that brought heretofore new freedoms and rights as well as greatly expanded opportunities for political participation. It may be that these are embraced and internalised by citizens on a gradual basis. Post-apartheid South Africa has also undergone rapid demographic change. Almost one-third of South Africa's present electorate is now too young to have any direct memory of race classification, passes, official segregation of churches, schools, residences and interpersonal relationships, the drastic repression of dissidence and resistance, or of the armed resistance and popular struggle against apartheid. Nor does this cohort have any experiential memory of F.W. de Klerk's historic release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of liberation movements, the searing violence of the transition period, the momentous 1994 election, or of the conclusive 1996 passage of the country's Constitution. In addition, in 1998 South Africa implemented a new school curriculum intended, among other things, to promote democratic and other constitutional values. Thus, the 'Born Free' cohort, as those who have come of age since the advent of democracy are called, are not only growing rapidly, but are increasingly comprised of young people who have spent some or all of their high school years exposed to a pro-democracy curriculum.
As a result of these developments, South Africa's democratisation process offers a useful laboratory in which to begin testing competing accounts of democracy and attitude change. Given our knowledge of shifts in popular attitudes in postwar Europe and Japan (discussed below), theories of socialisation and democratic habituation (also discussed below) would lead us to expect significant pro-democratic shifts in South Africa's political culture, especially amongst the 'Born Frees'. In this paper, I use a series of public opinion surveys conducted since 1995 to assess South Africans' support for democracy and changes therein, paying particular attention to differences across potentially discrete political generations, including the 'Born Frees'.
Culture Change in Post-authoritarian Societies
Scholars of democratisation and public opinion have produced a range of possible explanations of mass attitude change. First, with a basis in rational choice theory, one possible route might pass through re-designed or reformed political institutions whose improved performance gradually demonstrates to citizens that democracy is better able to produce desired political and economic goods than alternative regimes (Grindle 2000; Przeworski 1995) . In contrast to changing attitudes to democracy through instrumental cost-benefit calculations, a second group of scholars emphasise various forms of popular learning about the intrinsic value of democracy. On one hand, people in new democracies might learn from the new political environment with its experiences of meaningful participation and influence, and subsequently become 'habituated' to various features of democratic citizenship (De Tocqueville 2003; Hadenius 2001; Putnam 1993; Rustow 1970) . Or, with a basis in psychological theories of human needs (Maslow 1954) , people might draw conclusions from the experience of material and physiological (in)security provided by their economic environment and prioritise either basic survival or more advanced self-expression needs such as democracy (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) . A more didactic path to attitude change, however, would take the form of explicit teaching about the intrinsic legitimacy of democracy and its institutions through the school system (Nie, Nunn and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Slomczynski and Shabad 1998) , the mass media (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer 2007) or through adult civic education programmes (Finkel 2002; Finkel and Ernst 2005; Finkel and Smith 2011; Kuenzi 2011) .
Whether these various dynamics effect attitude change across the populace or mostly (or wholly) within new, post-authoritarian generations depends on at least two separate issues. The first is the validity of what Inglehart (1990) called the 'socialisation hypothesis', that the experiences of late adolescence have an exceptionally powerful influence on the development of individual attitudes and are far stronger than subsequent 'period' or 'life-cycle' effects. The second issue is whether post-authoritarian generations do in fact encounter economic, political or educational experiences that differ significantly from those of older generations.
Inglehart and his colleagues have documented impressive longitudinal crossnational evidence of value change driven largely by economic growth and proceeding along generational lines (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) . Yet other scholars have documented significant increases in pro-democratic values and attitudes in a series of newly democratic, post-authoritarian societies such as West Germany (Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt 1981) , Austria (Mu¨ller 1984) , Italy (Sani 1980) , Japan (Ikeda and Kohno 2008; Richardson 1974; Richardson and Flanagan 1984) and Spain (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986; Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1997) . In each of these societies, new democratic regimes remoulded citizens' beliefs into a culture supportive of democracy, largely through considered efforts in the schools, but also in media and civil society, to educate a new generation of democratically minded citizens. Dalton's (1994, 471-72) description of the Federal Republic of Germany is illustrative.
Confronted by an uncertain public commitment to democracy, the government undertook a massive programme to re-educate the public. The schools, the media and political organisations were mobilised behind the effort. And the citizenry itself was changing -older generations raised under authoritarian regimes were being replaced by younger generations socialised during the postwar democratic era. These efforts created a political culture congruent with the new institutions and processes of the Federal Republic. The West German public also learned democratic norms by continued exposure to the new political system. As a result, a popular consensus slowly developed in support of the democratic political system. Finally, other scholars account for generational change not so much by changes in the content of education as by changes in the quantity and quality of education received by new generations, which result in higher levels of cognitive sophistication (Dalton 2008; .
To complicate matters, differing interpretations are sometimes advanced by the same authors, depending on the situation. For example, while Dalton emphasised new educational content in the case of postwar Germany, his analysis of value change in postwar United States emphasises the rapid expansion of university education. We must also take at least some note of the fact that the rapidly accumulating literature on public opinion in the new 'Third Wave democracies' has, thus far, produced very little evidence of important generational differences in support for democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Chu et al. 2008; Markowski 2005; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose, Mishler and Munro 2006; Shin 1999) .
South Africa's Political Generations
Before we focus on the Born Free generation, we note that post-apartheid society consists of five potentially distinct political generations. Each generation is associated with an era characterised internally by continuity in social, economic and political trends, but demarcated by major historical disjunctures that sharply distinguish it from surrounding eras. Yet while all South Africans were shaped by the dominant trends within each era, they were also certainly affected in very different ways depending on their racial classification. The oldest, and smallest group, the Pre-apartheid generation, reached their politically formative years (defined here as the age of 16) before the historic victory of the National Party (NP) in the 1948 election and the imposition of the system of official race classification and segregation. While this cohort still constituted a significant proportion of the electorate in 1994, they have now shrunk to less than 2 per cent of all voters (and will be folded into the next youngest generation for the empirical analysis in this paper). The next group, the Early Apartheid generation, comprise people who turned 16 between 1948 and 1960, meaning that they have no working memory of life before the rise of the NP and the imposition of 'petty' apartheid (the legal matrix of laws imposing and enforcing racial classification and separation). While this generation would have had some experiences with various forms of popular protest against apartheid (such as bus boycotts, pass protests, and the Kliptown Congress and the creation of the Freedom Charter), almost all of these protests were intended to appeal to the consciences of more reasonable segments of white opinion to effect political reform (Meredith 2010) .
The third cohort, what I call the Grand Apartheid generation, consists of those citizens who turned 16 between 1961 and 1975. While their early memories were seared by the stirrings of internal black resistance (the Poco uprising, the marches that led to the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, and foreign news of gathering decolonisation and even Kenya's Mau-Mau rebellion), this generation's memories of late adolescence and early adulthood also carry the recollection of the post-Sharpeville reaction of the NP government which banned virtually all black political movements and imprisoned a whole generation of leaders, the most prominent being Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo. Indeed, throughout most of these people's early adult lives, the apartheid system and the new Republic (South Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth in 1960) were marked by increasing confidence in its impregnability. Under the leadership of H.F. Verwoerd, the NP government moved toward the idea of 'grand' apartheid and separate development through the Bantustan system with the ultimate aim of reversing black urbanisation to the 'white' cities and suburbs and creating a constellation of independent black republics within the borders of white South Africa. During this period, African children were gradually moved out of church-based mission schools and into government schools, ordered along the new principles of 'Christian National Education'. The other dominant characteristic of this period was South Africa's rapid growth and industrialisation, which saw a significant increase in African incomes -a process that itself began to sow the seeds of the demise of grand apartheid by attracting more and more Africans to urban townships to meet the expanding need for industrial labour.
However, white confidence and African quiescence came to an abrupt end in 1976 with the rise of the Black Consciousness movement and the Soweto uprising, an event that left its mark on virtually all South Africans old enough to remember, and ushered in the Struggle Generation, consisting of people who turned 16 between 1976 and 1996. Indeed, several other important events occurred around the same time to make this an important watershed, such as the first national television broadcasts (which allowed people to see first-hand coverage of the uprisings) and the increasing foreign threats to apartheid posed by the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique as well as the avowedly anti-Pretoria stance of the new Carter administration in the US.
While the overriding narrative of the 'petty' apartheid and 'grand' apartheid eras was one of acquiescence and stability, the principal theme of this era was violent resistance and reaction. Several thousand young people left the country in the years after Soweto and headed north to seek out the exiled African National Congress (ANC) (and other organisations) and obtain military training. But it was internal resistance, initially -and ironically -sparked by the NP's attempts to reform (and save) apartheid through the 1983 Tricameral Constitution that became the real hallmark of the age. The United Democratic Front (UDF) linked a large number of church groups, civic organisations and trade unions in wide-ranging protests and boycotts, and triggered unprecedented levels of violent police repression, detention and bans on the part of the state, culminating in two successive States of Emergency and the deployment of the army in black townships. And as the exiled ANC scrambled to keep up with the internal resistance movement, it unleashed a 'People's War' of intimidation and violence against those blacks who served in the South African police, participated in homeland political systems, or who might consider allowing themselves to be 'co-opted' by the new system of elections for 'own' Houses of Parliament for coloured and Indian South Africans or for 'Black Local Authorities' in urban townships. This internal war also featured violent confrontation between the UDF and alternative black organisations such as the black consciousness-inspired Azanian People's Organisation and Inkatha, the governing party of the KwaZulu homeland (Jeffery 2009; O'Malley 2007) .
Some might take issue with the temporal boundaries I have created for this generation. For instance, the 1990 unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners might be seen as the start of a new era. However, the sharp increase in political violence between 1990 and 1994 means, for our purposes, that the period was really just a continuation of the previous years of resistance, violence and reaction, rather than a significant departure. And while the 1994 election and the passage of the 1996 Constitutions were certainly major events that left deep and profound memories, their real generational significance, even to an 18-year-old casting her first vote in 1994 or watching the ratification of the Constitution on television, was to serve as the final act in a long trauma of protest, struggle and violence.
Rather, the real attitudinal watershed should be most visible in those young people who came of age politically after 1996. Beginning in 1997, growing numbers of young people began to move through the ages of 16, 17 and 18 and enter the political arena with little if any first-hand experience of the trauma that came before: the 'Born Frees'. Their first political experience, possibly casting a vote in the 1999 election, was with a relatively normal, though clearly reform-minded, democratic political system. While some backward-looking dramas were still being played out, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the order of the new day was forward-looking: massive state investment in construction of houses and other infrastructure, the transformation of the state, educational reform, and growth-oriented economic development.
The Born Frees: What Should We Expect?
A closer reading of post-apartheid history suggests that the expected level of the Born Frees' commitment to the new democratic regime is by no means selfevident. Hypotheses will differ sharply depending upon whether one focuseson one hand -on the potential impacts of the newfound opportunities of the post-1994 democratic dispensation, the new schooling system and curriculum, and the vast expansion of infrastructural development, or -on the other handon the continuation of one-party dominance (with the ANC replacing the NP), the enduring levels of poverty and unemployment, or the increasingly dysfunctional education system.
A Brave New World?
In many ways, the Born Frees confront a totally different world than that of their parents. There are no official limits to where they can go, work or live, or on whom they may date or marry. They have experienced a series of peaceful democratic elections that increasingly turn on new issues and personalities with diminishing links to the past. They consume news provided by a reformed public broadcaster, and have increasing access to privately owned radio and television broadcast news, as well as to increasing amounts of private and international news on subscription satellite television. The combination of a range of growth-oriented economic reforms in 1996 and a long period of growth in the early 21st century enabled the South African government to build over 2 million houses, and provide millions of citizens with access to water, sewerage and health clinics, and greatly expand a series of welfare subsidies to poor households. This period also witnessed the rapid expansion of a new black middle class.
Where the preceding generation were often seen as the 'lost generation' with months if not years of schooling lost to school boycotts and political violence, the Born Frees have come through most of their schooling without politically inspired interruption. They have received almost universal education in a reformed school system. Increasing numbers of black students attend heretofore racially exclusive schools and universities. Moreover, the style and content of primary and secondary education have substantially changed with the advent of a new 'outcomes-based' curriculum (called 'Curriculum 2005') designed to teach democratic values, as well as non-racialism and non-sexism, implicitly through a range of innovative methods such as group participation and problem-solving exercises across a range of 'learning areas' such as arts and culture, life orientation, and social studies. Thus, theories of socialisation would provide us with strong reasons to suspect that this new generation, with vastly different economic and political experiences and opportunities from those of their elders, and taught under a new school curriculum, would have internalised a belief in democracy and embrace democratic values at far higher rates than older generations.
The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same?
At the same time, there is also a great deal of evidence which would suggest that a picture of continuity (or even regression) is a more accurate portrayal of contemporary South Africa than one of positive change. Its relatively strong record of economic growth and deficit reduction since 1994 masks a bifurcated economy where levels of unemployment have hardly budged and the top and bottom of the income scales have moved further apart from each other than they were under apartheid. There is now a wider income gap between rich (the top fifth) and poor (the bottom fifth) blacks, than between blacks and whites as a whole (Leibbrandt and Levinsohn 2011; Leibbrandt et al. 2006 ). Many Born Frees face the same, if not greater, levels of unemployment, poverty, inequality and hopelessness as their parents. Official race segregation has been replaced by informal class segregation, and the vast majority of poor and working-class blacks still live in the former urban townships and rural Bantustans. While a small minority have escaped to previously white schools and universities, the majority toil away in increasingly dysfunctional schools with poorly trained teachers who struggle to cope with the new curriculum and who all too frequently simply fail to come to work. The youngest generation also confront other limits to their life chances in the form of escalating violent crime and HIV infection. From this perspective, many of the same theories of socialisation might produce very different expectations about the political orientations of the Born Frees or at least for some segments of this generation.
Testing Expectations
Based on a series of nationally representative surveys conducted by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (1998) The scale and speed of post-1994 demographic change in South Africa would appear to provide many possibilities for intergenerational differences in attitudes to democracy. But before examining attitudinal differences, I first look at the extent to which the Born Free generation, as of 2008, actually differ from previous generations in important demographic or behavioural aspects relevant to the various approaches to culture change outlined above (Table 1) . First of all, as a result of the combination of white emigration and declining family sizes amongst white, coloured and Indian South Africans (as well as urban black Africans), the Born Frees are more likely to be black (83 per cent) and less likely to be urbanised (43 per cent) than older generations (though the Pre/Early Apartheid generation is equally rural). Yet there is no evidence that the school-building programmes and vast increases in government expenditures in education have yet had any impact on educational attainment. Born Frees have statistically equivalent levels of university education as previous generations, and lower levels of high school completion than the immediately preceding Struggle generation (though clearly more than older generations).
If only owing to the typical profile of youth, it is perhaps understandable that newspaper readership is slightly lower amongst the Born Frees (compared with the Struggle generation, and statistically indistinguishable from the Grand Apartheid group). But it is very surprising that levels of internet use are essentially the same across the youngest three generations (with substantially lower levels amongst the Pre/Early Apartheid generation). And if South Africa's new democratic dispensation has created more spaces for legal political participation, the Born Free generation have not taken up these opportunities at higher rates than older citizens. They are less likely to be active members of community or religious groups, to join with others in raising local issues, attend community meetings, or contact their local councillor. In contrast to the common view of the wave of protest that has hit South Africa's local municipalities over the past several years, the Born Frees are also less likely to have attended a protest. And while there is no evidence that the post-apartheid generation is materially better off than older South Africans, they are not substantially worse off. Born Frees encounter substantially higher levels of joblessness, but otherwise levels of physical and material in/security are fairly constant across all generations, whether this is measured in terms of victimisation by corrupt bureaucrats, exposure to crime, shortages of food or cash income, or the loss of friends or family to AIDS.
Thus, while there were good reasons to suspect that the rapid demographic change which South Africa has experienced since 1994 might interact with its new schooling system and new democratic freedoms and institutions to produce a qualitatively different generation, the evidence in Table 1 would seem to provide initial, tentative support for a conclusion of continuity rather than sharp generational change.
I next proceed to examine generational differences in citizen orientations to democracy by looking to over-time trends in South Africans' responses to a series of Afrobarometer survey questions that comprise a larger multi-item index called 'demand for democracy'. It consists of the widely used survey question on support for democracy ('democracy is always best') and Figure 2 is slight, it might obscure more important generational differences in both absolute terms as well as relative trends. Thus, in Figure 4 , I examine longitudinal trends by generational cohort. These data produce two tentative conclusions. First, there is no evidence that the Born Frees are more committed to democracy than other generations. In fact, they appear to often be the least committed. At the same time, there would seem to be few if any important generational differences since Afrobarometer began asking these questions in South Africa in 2000.
Yet the small generational differences displayed in Figure 4 could obscure other age-related differences that might emerge once we statistically control for other variables. To check for this, and to assess the varying paths to attitude change discussed above, I estimate a series of OLS regression models, each of which adds a new series of predictor variables clustered into the different theoretical approaches to culture change (see Table 2 ).
In Model 1, I regress demand for democracy on a series of dummy variables representing the hypothesised political generations discussed above (with the Struggle generation as the excluded reference group). The results indicate that members of both the Born Free and Grand Apartheid generations are less committed to democracy than the Struggle generation, with no significant effects for the Pre/Early Apartheid respondents. The overall effects of these generational differences, however, are minimal and explain less than 1 per cent of variance in demand for democracy. Model 2 then adds a series of controls for race (with Black as the referent category), as well as for age (to ensure we really are measuring historically unique generational effects and not just the effect of chronological age), gender, urban-rural residence, and identification with the ruling ANC. Once we do this, the effect of generational difference disappears. Instead, we see that demand for democracy is higher amongst urban dwellers (which helps to account for the lower demand amongst the Born Frees since we saw in Table 1 that they are more likely to live in rural areas), as well as amongst Indian respondents. In Model 3, I attempt to assess the impacts of various agents of 'socialisation through teaching', either through conveying explicitly pro-democratic messages or by increasing citizens' cognitive and critical capacities. Thus, I enter a group of variables that measure levels of formal education, news media use, internet use, cognitive engagement (which consists of political interest and political discussion), political knowledge (measured here as the respondent's ability to identify a range of incumbent office-holders), and internal efficacy (the extent to which respondents believe they are able to make elected officials listen, and have their voices heard between elections). The most striking result is the absence of any positive impact of education or of news media use, two findings very much at odds with what we know about other emerging African democracies (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mattes and Mughogho 2010) . But while those who use mainstream news media are not any more democratic, those who regularly use the internet are, as are those respondents with higher levels of political knowledge and higher levels of cognitive engagement. Those respondents with higher levels of internal efficacy however, are actually less democratic (we shall return to this surprising finding below). Overall, however, these effects are relatively minor. Generational, demographic and cognitive factors still account for only 6 per cent of variance in demand for democracy. Model 4 then adds a series of variables intended to tap the extent to which involvement in various forms of democratic participation builds popular support for democracy through 'habituation'. Thus, I use measures of membership in religious and community groups, whether or not people had voted in the previous (2004) national election, taken part in community politics (attending community meetings and joining local action groups), contacted members of parliament and local councillors, or had taken part in violent protests. The addition of these variables doubles the predictive power of the overall model (Adjusted R 2 ¼ .105). Nonetheless, the direction of the impact is not uniformly positive. While community participation is indeed associated with higher levels of demand for democracy, membership in community groups, contacting officials, and attending protests are all negatively associated with demand for democracy. Taken together (and recalling the negative impact of internal efficacy discussed above), this suggests that most forms of engagement with elected representatives and government officials provide people with a generally negative experience, especially in rural areas, and that it is this experience which tends to alienate South Africans from democracy rather than 'habituate' them to it. Much of this surely stems from South Africa's electoral system, which provides political party leaders with powerful levers to induce high levels of discipline amongst their elected representatives, rather than responsiveness to the electorate (all national MPs are elected from regional and national party lists, as are a third of local councillors; and local ward councillors have to resign their seat if they switch party allegiances).
To assess the impact of physical and material in/security, Model 5 adds variables measuring the extent to which South Africans have been victimised by corrupt bureaucrats, and have experienced crime or crime-related fear, whether they are jobless, and whether they have experienced poverty (measured by a series of questions about the frequency with which people have gone without basic necessities in the past year), and finally whether they had lost a close friend or family member to the AIDS pandemic. While these variables increase the explanatory power of the model (Adjusted Rand experiential characteristics, South Africans who have had to pay bribes, who are jobless, and who endure high levels of poverty are all less willing to endorse democracy and reject non-democratic alternatives. At the same time, and perhaps surprisingly, those people who say they know someone who has died of AIDS exhibit higher levels of demand.
Our ability to account for South Africans' orientations to democracy increases substantially once we take into account their evaluations of the performance of their new democratic institutions. Model 6 adds a range of variables that ask respondents for their evaluations of the level of political freedom (such as speech, voting and association), the quality of the electoral process (whether elections are free and fair, whether parties campaign peacefully, and whether people think their vote is secret or have to fear intolerance and violence), the extent of rule of law (whether the president obeys the law, guilty elites and ordinary citizens are punished, and citizens are treated equally under the law), and responsiveness (whether elected officials listen to public opinion, as well as the extent of official corruption). In terms of economic goods, I use two indices that assess evaluations across a range of macroeconomic management (for example, reduce prices, creating jobs, reduce inequality), and the provision of micro-level services (for example, water, health clinics, roads), as well as a single indicator that assesses the equity aspects of government economic policy.
At this point, the cumulative model now explains 25 per cent of the variance in commitment to democracy. While this indicates a strong element of 'instrumentalism' whereby people hinge their support for democracy on their current satisfaction with institutional performance, it also confirms a great deal of previous research findings that political goods are more important than economic ones. The perceived quality of the electoral process, extent of political freedom, and level of corruption amongst government leaders all have important impacts. But, with one small exception, evaluations of the economic performance of government are not associated with attitudes toward democracy. Model 6 also reveals two other significant findings. Once we take South Africans' current evaluations of the delivery of political and economic goods into account, white respondents prove to be more democratic, and most importantly for our present concerns, respondents in the Born Free generation are revealed to be less democratic.
Since it is the most fully specified model, Table 2 also presents the Bloc R 2 for each theoretical cluster of variables in Model 6 as well as the standardised Beta weights for each significant regression coefficient. The Bloc R 2 demonstrates that performance evaluations account for about three times as much variance in democratic commitment as do physical or material in/security, or participation, and almost 10 times as much as the standard methods of didactic socialisation through pro-democratic messages or through cognitive development. Across theoretical families of explanation, the Beta weights reveal that the strongest individual predictors are evaluations of the quality of the electoral process (Beta ¼ .289), community participation (.165), internal efficacy (7.136), the extent of political freedom (.126) and involvement in protest (7.101).
It is also worthwhile to reiterate a finding discussed above: in contrast to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, where formal education (at least up to high school) makes a substantial contribution to support for democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mattes and Mughogho 2010) , education has no significant impact across the South African population. This might be understandable given that neither black nor white South Africans were exposed to pro-democratic teachings in apartheid schools. Yet the finding that Born Frees are less democratic suggests that the new post-apartheid school curriculum has yet to instil any of the intended democratic value outcomes amongst a significant proportion of students.
Yet while the Born Free generation are less democratic, the negative coefficient of a dummy variable indicates at this point only that the intercept for this cohort is lower than for the reference group (the Struggle generation). The more important question, however, is whether the other variables have different effects (slopes) across different generational cohorts. Thus, in Table 3 , I reestimate the full model first amongst the Born Frees, and then amongst all other South Africans to enable a straight comparison to test for significant differences. The results suggest that the Born Frees differ from other South Africans in at least three ways. First, in contrast to older South Africans, Born Frees do not exhibit any internet effect, nor do they appear to link their attitudes to democracy to their evaluations of political corruption or the ability of the government to provide micro-level services and welfare. Second, the negative impact of internal efficacy, membership in community groups, and of contacting political leaders is significantly higher amongst the Born Frees than for other South Africans. And third, while membership in religious groups does not have any impact amongst the total electorate, it has a negative impact amongst the Born Frees. Thus, it seems that whatever frustrations South Africans experience in attempting to contact elected representatives or to engage broadly with the political process, they are experienced even more sharply amongst the Born Frees.
Finally, Table 3 reveals that the finding that formal education fails to contribute to pro-democratic support in South Africa also holds amongst Born Free respondents. This suggests even more strongly that the new 'outcomesbased' Curriculum 2005, which was supposed to promote a series of values conducive to democratic citizenship, has as of yet failed to effect attitudinal change. This new curriculum has encountered two important types of criticism. First, some argue that the intended value outcomes, including democracy, are simply too implicit in the curriculum for most students to appreciate. There is no specific place for the explicit teaching and discussion of democratic government, let alone the value and superiority of democracy as a form of government. Perhaps because of their attraction to 'social constructivism' and the relative status of knowledge, the framers of the new curriculum seem to have been embarrassed at the prospect of replacing one official orthodoxy with another (Allais 2009 ).
Second, while it is clearly possible to teach democratic values implicitly through methods such as group participation and problem-solving exercises, this requires highly skilled teachers who are provided with a great deal of curricular guidance and institutional support. But some scholars argue that since Curriculum 2005 was implemented, teachers have received precious little guidance or special training (Jansen and Christie 1999) . This criticism may find some support in the finding in Table 3 that the democratic advantage of white respondents holds only amongst Born Frees. This suggests that the new school curriculum may have had some effect, but only amongst the recent products of the country's relatively advantaged, historically white schools with better qualified and more highly trained teachers who were in a better position to implement the new curriculum.
Conclusion
In 1994, the combined prospects of demographic change and a radically changed political system might have held out the promise of rapid movement toward a transformed citizenry, based primarily on an emerging post-apartheid generation imbued with the values of the new South African citizen. To be sure, we have only tested for one of these values; and similar enquiries should focus on other variables such as national identity, racism, government legitimacy, and participation. But as far as popular demand for democracy goes, the postapartheid generation are less committed to democracy than their parents or grandparents. Rather than re-drawing the country's main cleavages along lines of age and generation (as in postwar Germany), many of the key fault lines of apartheid (such as race, urban-rural residence, class and poverty) have been replicated within the new generation. Fifteen years on, South Africa's democracy remains as dependent on performance-based 'specific' support as ever (Mattes and Thiel 1998) . But whatever advantages might accrue from the new political experiences of political freedom and a regular, peaceful, electoral process, they are diminished by frustrating encounters with the political process, victimisation by corrupt officials, and enduring levels of unemployment and poverty.
